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24 June 1947

REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE NIA

(Preliminary personal remarks pertinent to the Director's
initial attendance)

Having been in office so short a time I desire to limit my remarks to summarizing briefly the progress that CIG has made since the last meeting of the NIA on 12 February 1947.

Atomic Energy Commission

It will be recalled that at that last meeting you approved the issuance of NIA Directive No. 9 providing for the transfer from the Manhattan Engineering District to the CIG of military intelligence personnel and the centralization in CIG of the coordinating responsibility for collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence pertaining to foreign atomic energy developments. Immediately thereafter informal working agreements were established and we have every reason to hope that a formal agreement is imminent.

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Running a close second to the Atomic Energy Commission in importance as a customer of CIG and in my opinion probably leading it eventually on the basis of volume is the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

SWNCC is the interdepartmental or national policy group; CIG is the interdepartmental or national intelligence group. National policy should be built on national intelligence. A most satisfactory formal liaison has been established by CIG with the SWNCC secretariat. I plan personally discussing with Mr. Saltzman, Chairman of SWNCC, the manner in which CIG can further assist through the preparation of those intelligence reports and studies which the SWNCC committees should have, particularly right now the Ad Hoc Committee for Economic Aid.

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Joint Research and Development Board

In implementation of established agreements between the Joint Research and Development Board and CIG, wherein CIG acts as the scientific intelligence facility of the Joint Research and Development Board, detailed working arrangements have been established, formulation of a National Scientific Intelligence Program has been initiated, and JRDB has started a flow of requests to CIG for scientific and technical intelligence. Consideration has been given by CIG in collaboration with the JRDB and the IAB agencies to scientific intelligence, and CIG has made continuing progress in meeting JRDB requirements. One weakness that has been disclosed by CIG coordination is the almost complete lack of fully qualified collectors of scientific intelligence.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

It will be recalled that the NIA has in the past discussed the CIG relationship to the JCS and the confusion and duplication which exists due to a lack of demarcation of duties between CIG and Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS. To date almost all CIG planning has had to be adjusted to this continuing problem. I understand that the JIC is now considering a proposal which may resolve the matter. I do not know its details. In fact I have no official way of knowing what takes place in JIC. I can only hope that at an early date the Director of Central Intelligence will be placed on the distribution list for JIC papers and will be invited to sit with the JIC, at least as an observer. Without some such close tie-in, there will continue to be a sad lack of coordination.

CIG Intelligence Program

In our attempt to meet our responsibilities to the President, to yourselves as members of the NIA, and to such special organizations as I have mentioned above, CIG has, as its personnel and facilities have permitted, gradually developed an intelligence program which when fully activated will, I believe, accomplish what was intended in the President's originating letter of 22 January 1946.

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We believe that no military or diplomatic planning can be successfully done except against a background of incontrovertible facts. These facts we call basic intelligence. In one degree or another these facts are needed by each of your departments. We are undertaking to coordinate the compilation of these facts, this basic intelligence, in handbooks to be called National Intelligence Surveys and to make them available in multiple copies to the departments. They will be loose-leaf so that they can be kept currently correct and so that they can be subdivided and distributed for specialized use. They will contain data on foreign government organization, pertinent history, topography, population and manpower, climate, strategic areas, health, and sanitation, etc. In a form strictly limited to wartime military use, some basic intelligence was compiled by the JIC in the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. We are trying to obtain agreement that this JIC undertaking, which continues in a less active manner, be consolidated with our National Intelligence Surveys. It is my understanding that the JIC is supporting this proposal before the JCS.

Situation Reports

Another form of intelligence reference we call Situation Reports. These reports are to cover countries or areas, and those special international subjects not restricted to countries or areas. They are designed to contain a concise summary of the situation, its implications, and its possible or probable effect on our own national security. These reports will also be loose-leaf in form for ready revision. They will give military, naval, political, economic, and diplomatic coverage, and the facilities of the several agencies will be used to a maximum in their preparation.

From time to time we hope to put out a composite overall analysis of the world situation, based on these separate Situation Reports.

Interagency Coordination of Production

The line of demarcation between national intelligence and agency intelligence is not always clear. But we try consistently to limit our

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production efforts strictly to that national intelligence which is essential to national policy planners, leaving to the agencies that agency intelligence required for operational use of departmental officers.

Further to avoid duplication, CIG has prepared and the IAB has unanimously approved a plan for the interagency coordination of the production of intelligence. The plan attempts to insure complete coverage and eliminate unproductive duplication. We are awaiting the comments of the JCS and the agency planners before submitting it to the NIA.

Our big problem in the production field is the NIA requirement
or comment
that the concurrence/of each IAB agency to each CIG intelligence report must be obtained, excepting current intelligence reports. I plan to review this situation personally with the IAB.

Current Intelligence

By NIA Directive No. 2 CIG is required to produce current intelligence for the use of the President, the members of this Authority, and a few others. Our adequacy surveys indicate that this product* is satisfactory to the recipients, but I would welcome an expression of your personal opinions. There remains some duplication of effort in this field by member agencies which it is hoped may soon be eliminated by mutual agreement. (* - Daily, Weekly, Special Evaluations)

Collection Coordination

Two NIA Directives have been issued affecting the collection of intelligence. One established a program for the overall coordination of collection activities. Recent field surveys by CIG officers indicate that in some posts abroad this directive has had a positive and beneficial effect. In others the generality of its terms has vitiated its force. A continuing study is being made by CIG, and suggestions for improvement will probably be made to the intelligence sections of your departments. With recent budget cuts the Government's limited facilities must be employed to their maximum efficiency to protect the national security.

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The second Directive announced the current essentials and intelligence objectives of this Government as regards China. The purpose behind this Directive was to pool all agency requirements and allocate them in accordance with field representative capabilities, thus using manpower efficiently and avoiding duplication. Further National Intelligence Requirements are in preparation.

CIG Collection

In addition to coordinating agency facilities for collection, CIG maintains centrally, for the benefit of all, four operations.

There is the Office of Special Operations. (Off the record remarks)

In the Office of Operations are the:

1. Contact Branch
2. Documents Branch
3. Foreign Broadcasts Intelligence Branch


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potential sources

The Documents Branch is continuing the work of the old Washington Document Center in the exploitation of captured documents from the Far East and is now absorbing the German Military Document Section and the Special Document Section of the War Department Intelligence Division. Some of these were joint British-Canadian-American projects. This presents a difficulty because of the lack of authority of CIG to maintain liaison with foreign governments, a difficulty which may require NIA resolution. As the backlog of these captured documents decreases we hope to transfer the attention of our translators to the exploitation of current foreign periodicals.

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In addition to the above active collection efforts and to field coordination, CIG is devoting much time to the coordination of the collection efforts of the agencies here in Washington through clearing house arrangements and central reading panels.

Other Problems

The continued absence of legislation continues to hamper the soundest development of CIG in several directions, both within and without the Government.

Agency jealousies and suspicions have not yet been allayed but are becoming less serious and some cooperation is becoming apparent. By holding frequent IAB meetings I hope to improve this situation.

I believe I should bring to your attention one serious problem. CIG is being called upon by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Research and Development Board, and others for scientific intelligence. CIG is unable fully to meet these requirements because of the general lack of properly qualified collectors of scientific intelligence.

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Some quarters have proposed the designation of scientific attaches to missions abroad. I have no present solution but in this age of scientific warfare it is a matter of prime importance.

Lack of central space adequate for all CIG offices brings about serious problems of administration and security.

Continuing evaluation of the organization and functions of CIG offices and our increasing experience serves constantly to improve our operations.

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